

Paper Please Workshop

Grady County Board of Commissioners

November 14, 2023

**PAPER
PLEASE**

BALLOTS

GEORGIANS FOR TRUTH.ORG



LOSS OF TRUST BY VOTERS

- Voters on all sides of the political spectrum have been raising concerns about electronic voting since its inception in the early 2000's.
- Sixty-two percent (62%) of Georgia voters are concerned that election results in their state don't accurately reflect the true number of voters, including 38% who are Very Concerned. Eighty-one percent (81%) of Republicans are at least somewhat concerned about the accuracy of Georgia's election results, as are 46% of Democrats and 56% of unaffiliated voters.

Upon discovery of the following outlined unlawful status of BMD's, vulnerabilities and election security issues, it is incumbent upon the elected representatives of Grady County to provide for secure and transparent elections. Counties need to decentralize the process, the poll books, and the counting.

https://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/partner_surveys/most_georgia_voters_think_trump_prosecution_unfair September 15, 2023

Since
2000's

62%

CYBERSECURITY EXPERTS AGREE

Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices

Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs Donna Curling, et al.
Curling v. Raffensperger, Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Prof. J. Alex Halderman, Ph.D.

96-pages of
ways to hack
Georgia's
voting
machines

29 Industry
Leading
Computer
Scientists
REFUTE the
MITRE Report

June 15, 2023

JASON PROVIDAKES, PH.D.,
President & Chief Executive Officer, MITRE

Dear Dr. Providakes:

We are researchers and academics who are recognized experts in the fields of cybersecurity and election security. We are writing to call your attention to an **unsigned report** written by the MITRE National Election Security Laboratory (NESL) entitled "Independent Technical Review Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices", and to **urge MITRE to retract this report**.

This **report was commissioned by Dominion Voting Systems in March 2022** and was recently unsealed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in the matter of *Curling v. Raffensperger*.¹ Dominion hired MITRE to write the report in response to vulnerabilities in Georgia's Dominion voting equipment that were discovered by Prof. J. Alex Halderman of the University of Michigan and Prof. Drew Springall of Auburn University while performing court-authorized security testing for the *Curling* plaintiffs.² Their findings were confirmed by CISA, which issued a security advisory about the vulnerabilities in June 2022.³ Dominion has developed updated firmware (Democracy Suite 5.17) that purportedly addresses some of the vulnerabilities.

Unlike Halderman and Springall, MITRE NESL was not provided access to Dominion's equipment and did not perform any security testing. Instead, MITRE attempted to assess the risk posed by potential attacks described in Halderman and Springall's expert report without essential access to the source information.

Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems

Wenke Lee, Ph.D.
Secure, Accessible & Fair Elections Commission

October 8, 2018

Background

At the SAFE Commission meeting in August 2018, I presented and discussed the design principles for secure voting systems. I shared the SAFE Commission website with a transcript of the meeting.


Only cybersecurity expert on the SAFE Commission created by Kemp to study feasibility for new electronic voting system.

Below, I offer a reference document for all Commissioners, which is: I.) a summary of basic security requirements for a secure voting system, II.) a comparison of the two main approaches under discussion (namely, hand-marked paper ballots vs. a ballot-marking device with paper printouts), III.) a description of the current consensus among computer scientists for a voting system based on hand-marked paper ballots, and IV.) a proposal that the State of Georgia consider cost-effective measures, such as leasing – instead of purchasing – voting machinery.

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REAL ISSUES WITH ICX and ICP



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ICS ADVISORY

Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X


Last Revised: June 03, 2022 Alert Code: ICSA-22-154-01

1. SUMMARY

This advisory identifies vulnerabilities affecting versions of the Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite ImageCast X, which is an in-person voting system used to allow voters to mark their ballot. The ImageCast X can be configured to allow a voter to produce a paper record or to record votes electronically. While these vulnerabilities present risks that should be mitigated as soon as possible, CISA has no evidence that these vulnerabilities have been exploited in any elections.

Exploitation of these vulnerabilities would require physical access to individual ImageCast X devices, access to the Election Management System (EMS), or the ability to modify files before they are uploaded to ImageCast X devices. Jurisdictions can prevent and/or detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities by diligently applying the mitigations recommended in this advisory, including technical, physical, and operational controls that limit unauthorized access or manipulation of voting systems. Many of these mitigations are already typically standard practice in jurisdictions where these devices are in use and can be enhanced to further guard against exploitation of these vulnerabilities.

**ImageCast X (ICX) =
Ballot Marking Device (touchscreens)**



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GEORGIANS FOR TRUTH

Grady County 2022 Voter Log Has 769 Instances of the Williamson County ERROR!

Posted 3 months ago by Georgians For Truth

Investigators in Williamson County, Tennessee reviewed the system log (SLOG) files which keep a diary of the scans of ballots for the election. The investigation showed multiple instances of an error called a "QR code Signature mismatch" with a warning message of "Ballot format or id is unrecognizable". Testers noticed that the machines counted the votes properly until the error was triggered. After the error was triggered, the current ballot in the machine was not counted and every ballot after it was not counted – until the machine was reset. This error was replicated and substantiated by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Investigation. **To date, this problem has not been fixed in any of the software updates.** Read more at <https://gaballots.com/evidence/f/scanner-failures-in-georgia-match-the-williamson-error>. What does that have to do with Grady County?

769 Instances of Williamson error in Grady County 2022 Election

GeorgiansForTruth.org obtained the SLOG files for the Grady County 2022 General Election. Below is a screenshot from the SLOG file

```
Nov 08/2022 06:50:02 Admin Audit * Software Version: 5.5.3-0002 #2 Fri Jul
27 09:18:31 CDT 2018
Nov 08/2022 06:50:02 Admin Audit * Election Project: Grady 2022 11 08 Gen C
Nov 08/2022 06:50:02 Admin *****
```

After inspecting the Grady County SLOG file from 2022 for the error "QR code Signature mismatch", the search resulted in **769 instances**. This error condition exists until the scanner is reset. Download the Grady SLOG file ([SLOGORR.pdf](#)).

97% of all Georgia counties checked have this error (65 out of 67).


**ImageCast Precinct (ICP) =
Scanner/Tabulator**

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UNREADABLE QR CODE IS UNLAWFUL

- [O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300\(a\)\(2\)](#) mandates voting on “electronic ballot markers” that ...(2) produce paper ballots which are **marked with the elector’s choice in a format readable by the elector**”.
- Pursuant to an OPINION AND ORDER by US District Judge Amy Totenberg in [Curling vs Raffensperger](#), dated October 11, 2020, the current electronic voting system in Georgia utilizing the Dominion ballot marking devices (BMD), scanning equipment and software violates Georgia Statute by utilizing “an unencrypted, humanly unverifiable QR code that can be subject to external manipulation and does not allow proper voter verification and ballot vote auditing.”
- Unreadable QR code cannot be VERIFIED by the voter and represents a foreign mark which **SPOILS** the ballot.
- **VOTER IS INJURED AND DEPRIVED OF VOTING RIGHTS**



INJURY OF VOTER/DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS

- The right to vote is the fundamental right upon which the republic rests.
- “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” [Duncan v. Poythress, 515 F Supp. \(N.D. Ga 1981\)](#) April 28, 1981
- “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government...” [Reynolds v. Sims \(1964\) 377 US 533.](#)
- [42 USC Section 1983](#) – “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...”

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CURLING vs RAFFENSPERGER

- **Page 64** – “The consensus among voting system experts is that the best audit trail is voter-marked paper ballots;”
- **Page 65** – “Paper ballots are designed to provide a human-readable recording of a voter’s choices. The term “paper ballot” here refers to a “voter-verifiable paper ballot,” in the sense that voters have the opportunity to verify that their choices are correctly recorded before they cast their paper ballots.”
- **Page 66** – BMD “by its nature, erases all direct evidence of voter intent.”
- **Page 68** – “only 6.5% of participants in the study noticed their votes had been changed by the BMD.”
- **Page 72** – “the overwhelming evidence from actual studies of voter behavior “suggests that less than ten percent of voters check their printouts and that voters who do check often overlook errors.”

**BMD
erases
intent**

**Only 6.5%
noticed**

**< 10%
Check**

LEGAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT VOTING BY PAPER BALLOTS

- [O.C.G.A. 21-2-281](#) “In any primary or election in which the use of voting equipment is impossible or impracticable, for the reasons set out in Code Section 21-2-334, the primary or election may be conducted by paper ballot in the manner provided in Code Section 21-2-334.”
- [O.C.G.A. 21-2-334](#) “If a method of nomination or election for any candidate or office, or of voting on any question is prescribed by law, **in which the use of voting machines is not possible or practicable**, or in case, at any primary or election, the number of candidates seeking nomination or nominated for any office renders the use of voting machines for such office at such primary or election impracticable, **or if, for any other reason**, at any primary or election the use of voting machines wholly or in part is not practicable, **the superintendent may arrange to have the voting for such candidates or offices or for such questions conducted by paper ballots.**”

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June 27, 2023

Re: Authority of Board of Elections

To County Commissioners, Board of Elections Members, or others Whom it May Concern,

I write to you in my capacity as a concerned citizen, to highlight and emphasize our shared commitment towards the administration of free, fair, and trustworthy elections in our county. It has been brought to my attention that there are increasing concerns about the practicability and public trust in the use of voting machines in the upcoming elections.

Furthermore, it appears that there are county attorneys that consistently are attempting to cause fear among public officials, namely Board of Elections members and County Commissioners, in order to discourage them from exercising any power or authority to increase trust in our election system. This letter aims to point out the legal grounds on which the County Election Board and the County Government have the authorization to choose the use of paper ballots over voting machines, and encourage that they use their power as elected officials to stand with the public trust, and not with monetarily interested politicians and their consultants, in order to restore faith in our electoral system.

I refer to the Georgia Code § 21-2-334 (2022), which states: "If a method of nomination or election for any candidate or office, or of voting on any question is prescribed by law, in which the use of voting machines is not possible or practicable... the superintendent may arrange to have the voting for such candidates or offices or for such questions conducted by paper ballots."

In the spirit of this law, the ongoing issues with voting machines, their credibility, and the potential inability to ensure a fair and free election (as shown my

Democratic primary vote in DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2022), indeed render their use impracticable. The multitude of candidates seeking nomination or elected office and other reasons contribute to the impracticability of the voting machines. In these circumstances, the law provides for the use of paper ballots.

Furthermore, the current practice of using electronic ballot markers producing Quick Response (QR) codes poses a significant problem. As per the Official Code of Georgia Annotated O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300, any electronic ballot markers must produce paper ballots in a format readable by the elector. Unfortunately, QR codes do not satisfy this requirement as they are not readable by the elector without the use of specialized equipment, thereby undermining transparency and trust in the electoral process and rendering their use impracticable.

Therefore, in accordance with GA Code § 21-2-334 and O.C.G.A. 21-2-300, it is my opinion that it would be both appropriate and legal to implement the use of paper ballots in the upcoming election to ensure its smooth conduct and the maintenance of public trust.

I kindly urge you to consider this proposition to switch to hand marked paper ballots for the upcoming election. The essence of democracy lies in a fair and transparent voting process, and the trust of our fellow citizens in that process. It is our collective responsibility to safeguard the integrity of our electoral system.

Thank you for your time and consideration. I look forward to your prompt action to address these concerns.

With Regards, I am,

/s/ Jordan Johnson

Jordan "Alex" Johnson

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SOS NO AUTHORITY OVER COUNTY

In *Pearson v. Kemp*, the Secretary of State argued that he had **NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY** over county election officials. He has no authority to fine **ANY COUNTY** – It is not in Georgia law.

During the hearing, Defendants' counsel argued that the secretary of state has no lawful authority over county election officials, citing *Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State*, 974 F.3d 1236, 1256–58 (11th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs' counsel responded that Plaintiffs could amend their complaint to add the elections officials in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee Counties, thus obviating the issue of whether the proper officials had been named as Defendants to this case.


Source: [Pearson v. Kemp, Document 14](#) (Read the document, it is only 4 pages long.)

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LAWFUL REMEDY –

- Hand-marked in INK Emergency Paper Ballots as per [Ga. Rules & Regs 183-1-12-.11](#)
- Retain 1 BMD at each precinct for accessibility
- Poll workers already trained on “Using Emergency Ballots”, page 72 of the [Georgia Poll Worker Training Manual](#)
- Scanned by ICP Scanner/Tabulator
- Post-Election Hand Count before Certification



EMERGENCY PAPER BALLOTS

Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 183-1-12-.11 Conducting Elections

- (c) If an emergency situation makes utilizing the electronic ballot markers impossible or impracticable, as determined by the election superintendent, the poll officer shall issue the voter an emergency paper ballot that is to be filled out with a pen after verifying the identity of the voter and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct. Emergency paper ballots shall not be treated as provisional ballots, but instead shall be placed into the scanner in the same manner that printed ballots in the polling place are scanned. The election superintendent shall cause each polling place to have a sufficient amount of emergency paper ballots so that voting may continue uninterrupted if emergency circumstances render the electronic ballot markers or printers unusable. For any primary or general election for which a state or federal candidate is on the ballot, a sufficient amount of emergency paper ballots shall be at least 10% of the number of registered voters to a polling place. The poll manager shall store all emergency ballots in a secure manner and ensure that all used and unused emergency ballots are accounted for. All unused emergency ballots shall be placed into a secure envelope and sealed such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.
- (d) If an emergency situation exists that makes voting on the electronic ballot markers impossible or impracticable, the poll manager shall alert the election superintendent as soon as possible. The existence of an emergency situation shall be in the discretion of the election supervisor. However, if a poll manager is unable to contact the election superintendent after diligent effort, the poll manager shall have the ability to declare that an emergency situation exists at the polling place. The poll manager shall continue diligent efforts to contact the election superintendent, and shall inform the superintendent as soon as possible of the situation at the polling place. The election superintendent, in his or her discretion, shall either overrule or concur with the declaration of emergency circumstances. While the determination of an emergency situation is in the discretion of the election superintendent, the types of events that may be considered emergencies are power outages, malfunctions causing a sufficient number of electronic ballot markers to be unavailable for use, or waiting times longer than 30 minutes.

HAND COUNT – DUTY TO CERTIFY ACCURATE

- Current O.C.G.A. provides for hand counting in both [O.C.G.A. 21-2-334](#), [O.C.G.A. 21-2-437](#), and [O.C.G.A. 21-2-493](#). It is the duty of the Election Superintendent to certify the elections of Grady County are accurate. Further, the oath of office the Election Superintendent and Board of Elections/Registrars [O.C.G.A. 21-2-70-15](#) requires “prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying on the same, that I will make a true and perfect return of such primaries and elections,...”
- Considering the security vulnerabilities, the neglected software maintenance requirements, and the illegality of utilizing the QR code described above, it would seem that the Election Superintendent, Board of Registrars, and Board of Commissioners would want to do everything in their power to ensure that going forward our county will only use voting methods that can be publicly verified to garner public trust in their accuracy.

RESULTS –

- Voter can VERIFY their ballot selections
- Voter INTENT known
- Voter CONFIDENCE improved
- TRANSPARENT count/audit of results
- Reduced equipment failures
- Significantly less Logic & Accuracy Testing
- County savings on maintenance, storage, transport, testing, etc. per [O.C.G.A. 21-2-71](#)
- Helps restore trust in Grady County, Georgia elections

DISCUSSION –

