



BALLOTS



Americans used hand marked, hand counted paper ballots for 200 years



Then we turned to machines because we wanted instant results



We thought the machines were accurate and safe – like a Scantron at school





Mountains of evidence suggest we have all have been duped.



Georgia Law

In support of Georgia counties authority to use hand marked, hand counted paper ballots counted by people at the precinct.

2022 Georgia Code
Title 21 - Elections
Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally
Article 9 - Voting Machines and Vote Recorders Generally
Part 2 - Voting Machines
§ 21-2-334. Voting by Paper Ballot When Use of Voting Machine Impossible or Impracticable

Universal Citation: GA Code § 21-2-334 (2022)

If a method of nomination or election for any candidate or office, or of voting on any question is prescribed by law, in which the use of voting machines is not possible or practicable, or in case, at any primary or election, the number of candidates seeking nomination or nominated for any office renders the use of voting machines for such office at such primary or election impracticable, or if, for any other reason, at any primary or election the use of voting machines wholly or in part is not practicable, the superintendent may arrange to have the voting for such candidates or offices or for such questions conducted by paper ballots. In such cases, paper ballots shall be printed for such candidates, offices, or questions, and the primary or election shall be conducted by the poll officers, and the ballots shall be counted and return thereof made in the manner required by law for such nominations, offices, or questions, insofar as paper ballots are used.

Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2022/title-21/chapter-2/article-9/part-2/section-21-2-334/

What does the law say about accuracy of the machines?

- 7. It shall be constructed of material of good quality in a neat and workmanlike manner;
- 8. It shall, when properly operated, record correctly and accurately every vote cast;
- 9. It shall be so constructed that an elector may readily learn the method of operating it; and
- It shall be safely transportable.

Source: 2022 Georgia Code

Title 21 - Elections

Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally

Article 9 - Voting Machines and Vote Recorders Generally

Part 4 - Optical Scanning Voting Systems

§ 21-2-365. Requirements for Use of Optical Scanning Voting Systems

Universal Citation: GA Code § 21-2-365 (2022)

Approval of the machines shall be REVOKED for any problem concerning the voting machines ability to accurately record or tabulate votes...

JUSTIA US Law

Search

Universal Citation: GA Code § 21-2-379.2 (2022)

c. No kind of direct recording electronic voting system not so approved shall be used at any primary or election and if, upon the reexamination of any such system previously approved, it shall appear that the system so reexamined can no longer be safely or accurately used by electors at primaries or elections as provided in this chapter because of any problem concerning its ability to accurately record or tabulate votes, the approval of the same shall immediately be revoked by the Secretary of State; and no such system shall thereafter be purchased for use or be used in this state.

2020 Election Inaccuracies - Coffee Co.

- Coffee Co. voting system produced 39 new votes during 2020 recount with no change in ballots cast
- 2. Voting system then failed to count 185 new ballots twice

2020 Election Inaccuracies —Coffee Co.

DISCREPENCIES IN THE NOVEMBER 3, 2020 GENERAL ELECTION AND RECOUNTS

Date	Activity	Action #	Trump	Biden	Jorgensen	Write-IN*	Total Votes	Internal Delta	
11/3/2020	Election Day 1	1	10578	4511	125	23	15237		
1/17/2020	Hand Recount	2	10578	4511	126	NA	15238		
	Compare 2 to 1		0	0	+1		+1	+1	
1/30/2020	Electronic Recount	3	10597	4520	136	0	15258		
	Compare 3 to 1		+19	+9	+11			+39	
	Compare 3 to 2	1	+19	+9	+12			+40	
1/30/2020	2nd uploaded 185 BALLOTS	4	NO CHANGE	NO CHANGE	NO CHANGE	0	NO CHANGE		
,,									
	The tabluated Electonic Recount revealed the above discrepencies								
	Investigation revealed we negelected to run 185 balltos: we then ran these ballots								
	we reviewed the resultsbut there was No Change in Vote Count Despite 185 Ballots Added								
(The on Site Dominion Rep could not explain why system would not update votes								
	The Dominion Rep directed the Board of Elections to make a decision about what to do.								
	FOR SOME REASON NO WRITE-IN COLUMN PRINTED ON THE RECOUNT SUMMARY								
	THERE WAS NO EXPLA	NATION O	R SOLUTIO	ON TO THIS	PROBLEM				
12/2/2020	Prepare to Certify	5	10597	4520	136	5	15258		
	Compare 5 to 1		+19	+9	+11			+39	
	Compare 5 to 2		+19	+9	+12			+40	
	There is a discrepency between Electronic Recount and total votes for both 1 & 2								
	There is a discrepency between Electronic Recount and total votes for both 1 & 2								
	Stated Differently after 3 counts a clear inconsistency exists as one compares the orgional election counts, the hand recount, and the electronic reco								
	Anomilies in software recounts create irreconciable difference in vote count which leaves the Board with no clear guidance as to which count to certi								
	Anomilies in software i	recounts cr	eate irrect	inclable di	nerence in vi	ote count wii	ich leaves the board with no	clear guidance as to which count to certif	
	Anomilies in software i * Write-IN and NO Vot					ote count wii	ich leaves the board with no	clear guidance as to which count to certif	

Investigation revealed we neglected to run 185 ballots: we then ran these ballots we reviewed the results there was no change in vote count despite 185 ballots added.

Source: Coffee County letter to Sec. of

State Raffensperger

https://www.scribd.com/document/66

3729833/Coffee-Election-Issues-

Official-Statement-20202

Revised 12/10/2020

2022 Primary Election Inaccuracies – DeKalb Co.

DeKalb District 2 Commission results reported on May 24

Candidate	Election Day	Advance Voting	Absentee by Mail	Provisional	Total	
Lauren Alexander	2993	1569	304	0	4866	ı
Marshall Orson	3524	1590	413	0	5527	r
Michelle Long Spears	1 029	2194	447	0	3670	
Total Votes	7546	5353	1164	0	14063 🌄	•

Includes results fro redistricted precin

District 2 results of audited hand count reported on June 3

Election Day	Advance Voting	Absentee by Mail	Provisional	Total
3004	1561	306	7	4878
2068	1541	418	5	4032
4078	2291	450	4	6823
53	39	43	0	135
9203	5432	1217	16	15868
	3004 2068 4 4078 53	3004 1561 2068 1541 4 4078 2291 53 39	3004 1561 306 2068 1541 418 4 4078 2291 450 53 39 43	3004 1561 306 7 2068 1541 418 5 4 4078 2291 450 4 53 39 43 0

System failed count 1805 vo

System shorted Mrs. Spears 3049 votes, added 1456 unearned votes to Mr. Orson

©2023 Voters Organized for Trusted Election Results in Georgia Est. 2006 – VoterGA.org

Accuracy? Remember Michelle Long-Spears in the DeKalb County 2022 Primary?

- Michelle Long Spears finished 3rd in the 2022 DeKalb Co. Dist. 2 Commission primary race but had no votes in the precinct where she and husband voted
- She reported the problem and DeKalb County Elections tried to run a machine recount. It failed
- DeKalb postponed certification to do a hand count audit of the District 2 Commission race.
- The hand count showed that she won and that 1,805 ballots were scanned but not counted.

The Halderman Report is Security Analysis of Georgia's 96-pages of ways to ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices hack Georgia's voting machines

Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs Donna Curling, et al.

Curling v. Raffensperger, Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Prof. J. Alex Halderman, Ph.D.

With the assistance of Prof. Drew Springall, Ph.D.

July 1, 2021

Source: Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 1681 Filed 06/14/23

Background

The "Halderman Report" is a **96-page** document authored by Alex Halderman of Michigan State University focused on the vulnerabilities of the Dominion Voting System in Georgia. Halderman is:

- Professor of Computer Science & Engineering.
- Director, University of Michigan Center for Computer Security and Society
- Director, Michigan Computer Science & Engineering Systems Lab.

EXPERT



Prof. Halderman writes that the touchscreens can subvert ALL security mechanisms – not a few, some or many but

ALL.

Principal Findings

I show that the ICX suffers from critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited to subvert all of its security mechanisms, including: user authentication, data integrity protection, access control, privilege separation, audit logs, protective counters, hash validation, and external firmware validation. I demonstrate that these vulnerabilities provide multiple routes by which attackers can install malicious software on Georgia's BMDs, either with temporary physical access or remotely from election management systems (EMSs). I explain how such malware can alter voters' votes while subverting all of the procedural protections practiced by the State, including acceptance testing, hash validation, logic and accuracy testing, external firmware validation, and risk-limiting audits (RLAs).

Haldeman Report Link

Prof. Halderman writes that Georgia voters should have NO CONFIDENCE their votes are counted correctly.

My technical findings leave Georgia voters with greatly diminished grounds to be confident that the votes they cast on the ICX BMD are secured, that their votes will be counted correctly, or that any future elections conducted using Georgia's universal-BMD system will be reasonably secure from attack and produce the correct results. No grand conspiracies would be necessary to commit large-scale fraud, but rather only moderate technical skills of the kind that attackers who are likely to target Georgia's elections already possess. Unfortunately, even if such an attack never comes, the fact that Georgia's BMDs are so vulnerable is all but certain to be exploited by partisan actors to suppress voter participation and cast doubt on the legitimacy of election results.

Haldeman Report Link



6.1 Extracting Election Secrets from Poll Worker Cards

Issue: Anyone with access to a single Poll Worker Card and the corresponding PIN can easily extract secret keys and other values used for securing election data throughout the county.

The ICX smart card protocol does not authenticate the device reading the card. As a result, anyone with the correct PIN can read the data on the card in a

A single poll worker card can be used to compromise an entire county.

29

Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 1681 Filed 06/14/23 Page 29 of 96

Source: Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 1681 Filed 06/14/23

MITRE

MP220250 MITRE PRODUCT

Independent Technical Review: Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices

The analyses, views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of The MITRE Corporation only and should not be construed as those of any other person, organization, or company.

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McLean, VA

July 2022

Secretary of State Raffensperger cited an <u>unsigned report from MITRE</u> that refutes Professor Haldeman's 96-page exhaustive report on the total fallibility of Dominion devices. <u>The report was paid for by Dominion</u>.

https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/MITRE Report.pdf

MITRE's unsigned report that was paid for by Dominion

MITRE

MP220250 MITRE PRODUCT

Independent Technical Review: Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices

The analyses, views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of The MITRE Corporation only and should not be construed as those of any other person, organization, or company.

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McLean, VA

July 2022

29 Industry
Leading
Computer
Scientists
REFUTE the
MITRE Report

In July 2023, 29 national experts in cyber security and computer programming demanded that MITRE retract their report due to gross oversights and flaws in the Dominion paid for report.

June 15, 2023

JASON PROVIDAKES, PH.D., President & Chief Executive Officer, MITRE

Dear Dr. Providakes:

We are researchers and academics who are recognized experts in the fields of cybersecurity and election security. We are writing to call your attention to an unsigned report written by the MITRE National Election Security Laboratory (NESL) entitled "Independent Technical Review Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices", and to urge MITRE to retract this report.

This report was commissioned by Dominion Voting Systems in March 2022 and was recently unsealed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in the matter of *Curling Raffensperger*.¹ Dominion hired MITRE to write the report in response to vulnerabilities in Georgia's Dominion voting equipment that were discovered by Prof. J. Alex Halderman of the University of Michigan and Prof. Drew Springall of Auburn University while performing court-authorized security testing for the *Curling* plaintiffs.² Their findings were confirmed by CISA, which issued a security advisory about the vulnerabilities in June 2022.³ Dominion has developed updated firmware (Democracy Suite 5.17) that purportedly addresses some of the vulnerabilities.

Unlike Halderman and Springall, MITRE NESL was not provided access to Dominion's equipment and did not perform any security testing. Instead, MITRE attempted to assess the risk posed by potential attacks described in Halderman and Springall's expert report without essential access to the source information.

Source: Letter to MITRE

29 Industry
Leading
Computer
Scientists
REFUTE the
MITRE Report

In July 2023, 29 national experts in cyber security and computer programming demanded that MITRE retract their report due to gross oversights and flaws in the Dominion paid for report.

MITRE's entire analysis is predicated on an assumption known to be wrong. As noted on the first page of the document, "MITRE's assessment of the researcher's proposed attacks assumes strict and effective controlled access to Dominion election hardware and software." That assumption was ill-considered when it was written, and it is ridiculous today, since we now know that the Georgia Dominion software has already been stolen and widely distributed and that election equipment in at least one Georgia county was repeatedly improperly accessed. In Coffee County, Georgia, the Dominion equipment was "stored in a room with an unlocked door to the outside of the building, a leaking roof, and walls with sunlight streaming through crevices." Yet MITRE's risk assessment assumes that Georgia perfectly protects the equipment from illicit access across all of its 159 counties.

The lapses that have already occurred in Georgia would be sufficient to let malicious parties develop and test attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities Halderman and Springall discovered, and potentially other vulnerabilities that they missed.

MITRE's analysis isn't simply wrong—it is dangerous, since it will surely lead states like Georgia to postpone installing Dominion's software updates and implementing other important mitigations. Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger recently announced that he will forgo installing Dominion's security patches until after the 2024 presidential election, no doubt acting in reliance on MITRE's misleading risk assessment. This announcement gives potential adversaries nearly 18 months to prepare to exploit the flaws against real elections in the state.

Source: Letter to MITRE

Among the 29 who signed the letter refuting MITRE's report:

Ron Rivest, Institutional Professor, MIT Andrew Appel, Professor, Princeton University Prateek Mittal, Professor, Princeton University Michael Fischer, Professor Yale University Philip B. Stark, Professor University of California at Berkeley Bruce Schneier, Technologist and Lecturer, Harvard University Eugene H. Spafford, Professor **Purdue University**

Source: Letter to MITRE

Sincerely,7

Josh Aas, Executive Director, Internet Security Research Group

Mustaque Ahamad, Professor, School of Cybersecurity and Privacy, Georgia Institute of Technology

Andrew W. Appel, Eugene Higgins Professor of Computer Science, Princeton University

Duncan A. Buell, Chair Emeritus, NCR Chair in Computer Science and Engineering, University of South Carolina, Columbia

Richard DeMillo, Professor and Charlotte B and Roger C Warren Chair in Computing, Georgia Tech, Atlanta GA

Zakir Durumeric, Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University

Aleksander Essex, Associate Professor of Software Engineering, Western University, Canada

Michael J. Fischer, Professor of Computer Science, Yale University

Robert Graham, cybersecurity expert

Matthew D. Green, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins University

Harri Hursti, independent security researcher, co-founder Voting Village @ DEF CON

David Jefferson, Computer Scientist, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired)

Douglas W. Jones, Emeritus Associate Professor of Computer Science, University of Iowa

Joseph Kiniry, Principal Scientist - Galois & CEO and Chief Scientist - Free & Fair

Patrick McDaniel, Tsun-Ming Shih Professor of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Prateek Mittal, Professor, Princeton University, Interim Director, Center for Information Technology Policy (CITP)

Olivier Pereira, Professor, UCLouvain

Ronald L. Rivest, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Peter Y A Ryan, University of Luxembourg

Peter B. Rønne, Chercheur, CNRS, LORIA, France

Bruce Schneier, security technologist and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School

E. John Sebes, Chief Technology Officer, OSET Institute

Barbara Simons, Computer Scientist, IBM Research (retired)

Kevin Skoglund, Chief Technologist, Citizens for Better Elections

Eugene H. Spafford, Professor, Executive Director Emeritus, CERIAS, Purdue University

Michael Alan Specter, PhD, Security Researcher

Philip B. Stark, Distinguished Professor of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley

Vanessa Teague, CEO, Thinking Cybersecurity Pty Ltd and Associate Professor (Adj.), The Australian National University

Poorvi L. Vora, Professor of Computer Science, The George Washington University

⁷ Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not indicate endorsement by the institutions mentioned therein



Over Two Dozen Computer Security Experts Call on MITRE to Retract its Georgia Voting Systems Report

Atlanta, GA (June 20, 2023) – Twenty-nine recognized experts in computer security sent a letter to Dr. Jason Providakes, president and CEO of the MITRE Corporation, urging him to retract a report MITRE produced last year on behalf of Dominion Voting Systems.

Dominion engaged MITRE to provide a expert report provided by Profs. J. Alex Halderman and Drew Springall on behalf of plaintiffs in the longstanding Curling v. Raffensperger election security lawsuit in Georgia. Coalition for Good Governance is the organizational plaintiff in Curling which it filed in 2017. The case does not allege any election was decided incorrectly.

"MITRE's report is irresponsible, plain and simple," said Professor Rich DeMillo, professor and Roger C. Warren chair of computing at Georgia Tech, and a signatory to the letter. "The report's title leads one to believe it is an independent and technical analysis when it is neither. Buried in a footnote is an admission that MITRE did not examine the Dominion system or use any discernible technical methodology. Commissioned and paid for by Dominion, the MITRE report is a misguided attempt to discredit the Halderman-Springall-CISA findings. In reality, MITRE Election Lab relied solely on representations from the Secretary of State's Office that physical security measures render the Halderman-Springall vulnerabilities low-risk. In effect, MITRE relied on blind faith, not careful, reviewable scientific reasoning, to create the misleading impression that there is another side to the vulnerability story. In the professional world, that is irresponsible. It skirts the line of unethical conduct."

Buried in a footnote is an admission that MITRE did not examine the dominion system or use any discernible technical methodology.

Source: Letter from Coalition for Good Governance



Because of the gravity of their findings, Halderman and Springall petitioned the court to permit them to submit their report to the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) under the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) program which was created to give security researchers an avenue to responsibly disclose cyber vulnerabilities found in critical infrastructure systems. CISA validated all of the Professors' findings and recommended the vulnerabilities be patched "as soon as possible."

In response, Dominion Voting Systems shared the sealed Halderman report with MITRE- in violation of the Court's Protective Order - and hired MITRE to respond outside of the litigation process to Halderman's findings. Computer security experts have criticized the MITRE report because MITRE issued its assessment without examining the Dominion voting machines. Furthermore, MITRE's unsigned report is predicated on the known false assumption that all Georgia's voting hardware and software are under strict access control, a premise that is belied by the fact that partisan operatives unlawfully accessed, copied and covertly distributed Georgia's voting system software to an unknown number of unauthorized individuals and entities.

Dominion voting systems hired MITRE to write the report.

The United States government validated **ALL** of Professor Halderman's findings and recommended the vulnerabilities be patched "as soon as possible".

Source: Letter from Coalition for Good Governance

What Dominion says about Dominion

Source: Dominion v. Fox News

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE


US DOMINION, INC., DOMINION)
VOTING SYSTEMS, INC., and)
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS)
CORPORATION,) C.A. No. N21C-03-257 EMD
Plaintiffs,)) CONSOLIDATED
v.)
) REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION
FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC,	Ó
Defendant.))
US DOMINION, INC., DOMINION)
VOTING SYSTEMS, INC., and)
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS)
CORPORATION,) C.A. No. N21C-11-082 EMD
Plaintiffs,))
v.	
FOX CORPORATION,	
Defendant.	

DEFENDANT FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS RULE 56 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

these security failures were "reported about in the news." *Id.* And just weeks before the 2020 presidential election, Dominion's Director of Product Strategy and Security, Eric Coomer, acknowledged in private that "our shit is just riddled with bugs." Ex.H2, Coomer Email (Oct. 30, 2020). Indeed, Coomer had been castigating Dominion's failures for years. In 2019, Coomer noted that "our products suck." Ex.H3, Coomer Message (Nov. 5, 2019). He lamented that "[a]lmost all" of Dominion's technological failings were "due to our complete f--- up in installation." Id. And in another instance, he identified a "*critical* bug leading to INCORRECT results." Ex.H4, Coomer Email (Jan. 5, 2018). He went on to note: "It does not get much worse than that." Id. And while many companies might have resolved their errors, Coomer lamented that "we don't address our weaknesses effectively!" Ex.H5, Coomer Email (Sept. 25, 2019).

Internal Dominion documents likewise confirm that Dominion machines suffered several potential glitches in the November 2020 election. After a security expert told the media that Dominion "software should be designed to detect and prevent th[e] kind of glitch" experienced in Antrim County, Michigan during the 2020 presidential election, Coomer told Dominion Vice President Kay Stimson: "He's not entirely wrong." Ex.H23, Coomer Email (Nov. 10, 2020). Likewise, in the immediate aftermath of the election, Dominion received complaints from jurisdictions in Georgia noting "irregularities with machine counts" that required Dominion's employees "to reprogram the machines." Ex.H24, Daulby Email (Nov. 8, 2020).

Source: <u>Dominion v. Fox News</u>



In Pearson v. Kemp, the Secretary of State argued that he had NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY over county election officials. He has no authority to fine ANY COUNTY – It is not in Georgia law.


During the hearing, Defendants' counsel argued that the secretary of state has no lawful authority over county election officials, citing Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1256–58 (11th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs' counsel responded that Plaintiffs could amend their complaint to add the elections officials in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee Counties, thus obviating the issue of whether the proper officials had been named as Defendants to this case.

Source: Pearson v. Kemp, Document 14 (Read the document, it is only 4 pages long.)

Brad Raffensperger

Mr. Raffenperger refutes the Halderman Report and offers "the MITRE Report" which is not signed by any computer scientist or anyone at all and Mr. Raffensperger's background is:

- Civil Engineer educated at the University of Western Ontario, not Computer Science
- He has no computer scientist or programmers on staff at the Sec. of State.



Medium

Conclusions:

- Georgia's system is not accurate
- Georgia's system is hackable
- Counties CAN take less risk by switching to paper ballots that will provide greater transparence AND save vast sums of money.



