A direct response to GAVREO’s defense of an obsolete, unverified, and vulnerable election infrastructure

By Field Searcy
October 18, 2026

When citizens walk into a voting booth, two constitutional promises must be kept: that their vote remains completely secret, and that the count is transparent, lawful, and accurate following procedures defined in the law.

On September 28, the Georgia State Election Board passed a formal resolution instructing its Executive Director to ask the U.S. Department of Justice to intervene and inspect Georgia’s voting system for critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities, ballot privacy breaches, and non-compliance with federal law.[1–3] On October 8, the Georgia Association of Voter Registration and Election Officials (GAVREO) fired back with a sharp letter, claiming that federal oversight is an overreach, that county election workers have everything under control, and that fixing the system is simply unworkable.[1]

GAVREO’s defense offers a polished narrative of reassurance, but it relies on technical obfuscation and administrative convenience. Saying a system is too difficult to fix does not make it secure.

For more than six years, citizens, computer scientists, and cybersecurity professionals have taken these exact facts to county boards of elections, county commissions, state legislative hearings, the Secretary of State, the Governor, and the State Election Board. At every step, the response has been delay, denial, and deflection.

Here are the documented facts behind GAVREO’s claims—and the hard questions Georgia officials continue to evade.

1. Shared Credentials: The “Unique Key” Myth vs. Plain-Text Reality

GAVREO insists that “there are no statewide passwords, administrator codes or security keys” because counties generate unique keys each election cycle.[1]

This claim is a half-truth that conceals a catastrophic architectural failure. Princeton Computer Science Professor Dr. Andrew Appel and independent forensic analyses have documented that the underlying Dominion system stores X.509 cryptographic keys in unencrypted plain text.[4,6] Storing cryptographic keys in plain text directly violates Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS 140-2), which govern baseline federal cryptographic security.[7]

These plain-text keys have repeatedly been extracted and used to decrypt the master Dominion administrator password (dvscorp08!), a vendor credential that has been exposed and unpatched since at least 2010.[6] Expert testimony in DeKalb County Republican Party v. Raffensperger confirmed that storing encryption keys in plain text leaves the entire architecture exposed.[4,7] Generating new county keys each election accomplishes nothing if the master keys can be harvested in plain text.

If an election system stores its master encryption keys in plain text where anyone with system access can extract them, how come officials continue to tell the public that changing county election keys makes the system secure?

2. The Ballpoint-Pen Demonstration: Passive Oversight Is Not Security

GAVREO dismisses the courtroom demonstration where election systems expert Dr. Alex Halderman  manipulated a ballot-marking device (BMD) using a ballpoint pen, claiming that vigilant poll workers watching the room and post-election paper audits eliminate the threat.[1]

Relying solely on human vigilance is a passive security model that completely ignores insider threats, ballot-programming tampering, and human error. In State Election Board Case SEB2023-025, ‘intentional human intervention’ resulted in double-counting of ballots. Poll workers are civic volunteers, not forensic counter-intrusion specialists.

More crucially, Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) creator Professor Philip Stark has established that machine-marked paper summaries cannot be audited against voter intent. An audit merely recounts the paper printout that the machine produced; it cannot tell you what the voter saw on the touchscreen if malicious software intercepted the choice before printing.[8] The pen demonstration exposed an absence of hardware-level secure boot, storage encryption, and intrusion detection.[5]

If top election audit experts warn that paper summaries cannot detect a hacked touchscreen, why do election officials pretend that watching the room protects the vote?

3. Obsolete Operating Systems: Running End-of-Life Software from Day One

GAVREO argues that undertaking a system upgrade is too risky and slow, comparing the current demand for security to the quick display patch deployed in 2020.[1]

This is a false equivalence that conceals a staggering neglect of basic IT hygiene. The 2020 update was a last-minute display fix for a specific candidate list bug. The current reality is that Georgia’s voting system was certified in 2019 under voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG 1.0) published in 2005.[9] The official EAC certificate of conformance reveals that the underlying infrastructure relies on software that has reached its official end of life:

  • Windows Server 2012 R2: Mainstream support ended in 2018.[9–11]
  • Microsoft SQL Server 2016: Mainstream and extended lifecycle support has completely expired.[9–10]
  • Android 5.1 Lollipop (ICX Prime tablets): Google security updates ceased in March 2018.[8]
  • Android 4.4 KitKat (ICX Classic tablets): Google security updates ceased in October 2017.[8]

GAVREO dismisses these expired systems by stating the machines are not connected to the internet.[1] But CISA Advisory ICSA-22-154-01 warns that critical vulnerabilities can be exploited offline via infected USB sticks, election setup media, or unauthorized physical connections.[5] Running end-of-life operating systems without security patches is not risk mitigation; it is managed negligence.

If no bank, healthcare provider, or critical infrastructure operator would dare run ten-year-old, unsupported operating systems, how come Georgia officials force citizens to cast their votes on them?

4. Ballot Privacy: Violations by Screen and by Digital Record

GAVREO claims that redacting voter names from election public records fully protects ballot secrecy.[1]

This claim ignores modern data linkage and technical research. Forensic researchers at DVSorder.org demonstrated that Dominion scanners and system log files (SLOGs) preserve ballots in the exact order they are scanned.[12] When Cast Vote Records (CVRs) and scanner logs are cross-referenced with polling-place check-in logs or exterior security cameras, individual ballots can be linked directly to specific voters—especially in smaller precincts.[12]

Furthermore, Article II, Section I, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution guarantees that voting shall be by secret ballot. Yet across the state, voters cast ballots on massive, brightly illuminated touchscreens that are easily visible from ten feet away by poll workers, observers, and neighbors standing in line.[13]

When the Georgia Constitution guarantees an absolute right to a secret ballot, why does the state use a system that exposes voter choices on bright public screens and preserves digital records that allow votes to be unmasked?

5. Unreadable QR Codes: Federal Violations Cannot Be Postponed

GAVREO defends the continued use of QR codes on ballots by noting that the Georgia General Assembly moved the statutory deadline to eliminate them to 2028.[1]

A legislative delay passed by state lawmakers does not cure a federal civil rights violation. Under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300, voting systems must be uniform, reliable, and accessible, ensuring that voters can independently verify their ballots. Under Georgia’s current setup, the human-readable text on the paper ballot is not what the optical scanner counts; the scanner tabulates the 2D barcode.[8]

No voter can verify the contents of an encrypted barcode with their eyes.[5,8] Pushing a statutory deadline back to 2028 is a legislative admission that the system is non-compliant, leaving voters without a lawful remedy for another two years.

If state law and federal civil rights require voters to independently verify their own ballots, how come the state counts an encrypted computer barcode that no human eye can verify?

6. ERIC vs. the State Election Board: Who Gets Georgia’s Voter Data?

GAVREO defends the Secretary of State sharing voter registration records with ERIC (the Electronic Registration Information Center), arguing that data privacy is protected because sensitive numbers are hashed.[1]

This defense ignores chain of custody and constitutional accountability. While the Secretary of State shares statewide voter data with ERIC—an out-of-state, private third-party entity that has faced scrutiny for sharing data with external researchers—the state’s own official State Election Board (SEB) has been denied access to the unredacted voter roll data required to carry out its statutory oversight duties.[1–3]

Why is an out-of-state private entity granted access to Georgia voter data, while the state’s own constitutional election oversight board is blocked from obtaining the records needed to verify the rolls?

7. The Impracticability of the System and the Mandatory Legal Remedy

GAVREO argues that implementing a major software upgrade or replacing machines is impossible before an upcoming election, treating the issue as an unavoidable stalemate.[1]

Georgia law already anticipates this exact problem. Under O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-281 and 21-2-334, whenever it becomes “impracticable” for any reason to use electronic voting machines, election superintendents are legally authorized and required to supply paper ballots.[13–14]

If electronic voting machines run on expired operating systems, rely on plain-text credentials, and print unreadable barcodes that cannot be verified by voters, using them is legally impracticable. Georgia State Election Board Rule 183-1-12-.11 and emergency procedures outline the standard protocols for paper ballots.[13] Hand-marked paper ballots, whether tabulated on verified optical scanners or manually tallied as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-437, provide an immediate, lawful remedy that requires zero software overhauls.

If election officials admit that electronic voting machines cannot be upgraded or secured in time, how come they refuse to implement the emergency paper-ballot remedy already written into Georgia law?

8. Federal Non-Compliance: A HAVA State Plan Frozen in 2008

GAVREO asserts that the federal government and the Department of Justice have no authority to review Georgia’s election system administration.[1]

This argument ignores the constitutional supremacy of federal law and the binding terms of federal election grants. Under the Help America Vote Act, states receive tens of millions of dollars in federal funding on the condition that they maintain an updated, approved HAVA Implementation Plan with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) records reveal that the official Georgia HAVA Implementation Plan on file with the EAC is dated September 2008.[15] It has not been updated in nearly two decades. Since 2008, Georgia scrapped its previous DRE voting system, spent over $100 million on an entirely new Dominion touchscreen fleet, and enacted sweeping overhauls to its election statutes. By failing to update its formal HAVA plan, has Georgia operated outside federal reporting compliance? This fact alone establishes clear federal jurisdiction for DOJ inquiry. [2,15]

When Georgia has accepted millions in federal election funding, why has the state failed for eighteen years to update its formal federal compliance roadmap to reflect the machines it actually uses?


Six Years of Warnings, Zero Real Action

This confrontation is not a sudden development. It is the culmination of six years of institutional stonewalling.

For more than six years, citizens, computer scientists, and election security advocates have presented these exact facts to every level of Georgia government. They brought them to county boards of elections and were told it was a state issue. They brought them to county commissions and were told it was an administrative detail. They brought them to state legislative committees, where deadlines were pushed to 2028. They brought them to the Secretary of State, who issued public reassurances that machines aren’t on the internet while ignoring memory-card threats.

The most disturbing reality is that local election workers—our neighbors, retirees, and volunteers—are the ones trapped in the middle. They are tasked with administering an election on an outdated, closed-source system they did not build, do not control, and are legally forbidden to alter.[13] Meanwhile, county boards use taxpayer dollars to fund membership dues to GAVREO, an unelected private association that lobbies against outside technical scrutiny and defends the very vendor architecture that puts those local workers in legal jeopardy.

Georgia voters are tired of being dismissed and told not to believe what independent cybersecurity experts have proven under oath. Saying a fix is difficult does not relieve state officials of their constitutional duty. If the officials entrusted with our elections cannot provide technical proof that our votes are secret, accurate, and secure, they should not be surprised when the citizens hold them accountable.

After six years of documented warnings from the nation’s top cybersecurity experts, federal agencies, and everyday voters, how come Georgia’s political leadership has spent more energy defending an obsolete vendor system than protecting the constitutional rights of the people?


Field Searcy is a technologist and co-founder of GeorgiansForTruth.org, a grassroots volunteer effort to bring election integrity to Georgia. Visit for more information and supporting documentation.

Sources and Documentation

[1] GAVREO Executive Board, letter to the Georgia State Election Board, October 8, 2026. Outlines GAVREO’s defenses regarding county security keys, the 2020 patch, operating system status, and legislative deadlines.

[2] James Mills, Executive Director, Georgia State Election Board, “Formal Request for Department of Justice Intervention,” September 30, 2026. Documenting formal board requests for federal investigation into system security, QR codes, and voter file sharing.

[3] Georgia State Election Board, “Dominion Update Coordination” Resolution, adopted September 28, 2026. Official board resolution directing the executive director to seek federal assistance from DOJ and DHS.

[4] Dr. Andrew Appel, “Georgia still using tragicomically insecure voting system”, Princeton Center for Information Technology Policy, February 24, 2026. Technical analysis of symmetric cryptographic keys, system vulnerabilities, and recommendations for hand-marked paper ballots.

[5] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X,” Advisory ICSA-22-154-01, June 3, 2022. Federal advisory documenting software vulnerabilities in ImageCast X machines and outlining required physical and operational controls.

[6] Cyber Ninjas, Antrim County, MI—Election Management System Application Security Analysis, April 9, 2021. Review documenting plain-text X.509 cryptographic key storage and decryption of administrative passwords (dvscorp08!).

[7] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), FIPS 140-2 Standards Publication, May 25, 2001. Federal Information Processing Standards governing cryptographic modules and unauthorized key exposure.

[8] Dr. J. Alex Halderman, “Security Analysis of the Dominion ImageCast X”, Princeton Center for Information Technology Policy, June 14, 2023. Expert analysis detailing BMD barcode tabulation, outdated Android builds, and audit limitations on machine-printed summary ballots.

[9] U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), Democracy Suite 5.5-A Certificate of Conformance and Scope of Certification, January 30, 2019. Certified system manifest listing Windows Server 2012 R2, SQL Server 2016, and VVSG 1.0 (2005) testing standards.

[10] Microsoft Corporation, “Plan your Windows Server and SQL Server end of support”. Official Microsoft lifecycle documentation covering extended support and security updates for server products.

[11] Raff Technologies, “Windows Server End of Life Dates: Every Version Compared”, updated September 17, 2026. Lifecycle timeline comparing Windows Server mainstream support, extended support, and security update cutoffs.

[12] Crimmins, Narayanan, Springall, Halderman, et al., DVSorder Research Summary, October 14, 2022. Forensic research detailing scanner ballot sequencing, Cast Vote Record correlation, and ballot privacy risks.

[13] Georgia Secretary of State, Official Rules and Regulations, Subject 183-1-12. State rules governing voting equipment, emergency paper ballots (Rule .11), polling place screen privacy (Rule .05), and state authorization for software changes (Rule .01).

[14] Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), § 21-2-334 (Use of paper ballots when voting machines impracticable). State statute governing procedures and mandatory paper ballot deployment when electronic systems are impracticable.

[15] U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Federal Register Notice: Publication of Georgia State Plan Under HAVA, 73 FR 54141, September 18, 2008. Federal Register filing recording Georgia’s last official Help America Vote Act state plan submission.

Georgia still uses QR codes to count your vote. Here’s what you need to know before you go to the polls:

✅ Check your ballot receipt BEFORE feeding it into the scanner

✅ Document any irregularies or anomolies you see or experience.

✅ Bring EVERYONE you know

The best weapon against fraud? Overwhelming turnout. VOTE ANYWAY.


KNOW YOUR RIGHTS

IF A POLL WORKER SAYS “YOU ALREADY VOTED”

Don’t panic. Don’t leave without asking for help.

  1. Ask for the poll manager. Say:
    “I have not voted in this election. Please check the record and contact the county election office to resolve this.”
  2. Ask what the record shows. Is it an absentee ballot marked received, an in-person check-in, or something else? Ask the manager to note the issue and explain the next step.
  3. Ask whether you can still cast a ballot. If your eligibility can’t be resolved at the polling place, ask the manager and county election office whether a provisional or challenged ballot is available. A “already voted” flag does not, by itself, guarantee a particular ballot procedure. Georgia’s provisional-ballot statute covers specified situations; ask officials to apply it to your circumstances. (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418)
  4. Make a contemporaneous record. Write down the time, polling place, what you were told, and the names or descriptions of the people you spoke with. Ask for the county office’s name and the incident or reference number, if one is created.
  5. Phone or photos? Don’t use your cellphone or record inside the polling place while voting is underway. Ask staff to contact the county office for you, or ask how to make a call without risking your ability to vote. Reentry to the enclosed voting area after leaving is generally restricted. (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-413(c), (e))
  6. Suspect intentional fraud or need outside help? Report the facts to the county election office. You may also contact local law enforcement from outside the polling place; call 911 for an immediate emergency. For state-level reporting information, see the State Election Board of Georgia. Or, call 678-340-5261 for the State Election Board Anonymous Election Complaints office.

Stick to what you know: being told “already voted” is a reason to request an explanation and report the incident—it does not, by itself, prove someone used your identity. For more detailed instructions, see below.


How To File a Complaint If They Say “You already voted”.

1. Can You Call Law Enforcement on the Spot?

  • Inside the Room: Because O.C.G.A. § 21-2-413(e) bans cell phone use inside the voting room, you should not make a phone call while standing in the enclosed space. Doing so could lead a poll manager to ask you to step outside or cite you for a polling-place disruption.
  • Stepping Outside to Call: If you step out of the voting enclosure or outside the building, you have the legal right as a citizen to call local law enforcement (police or sheriff) to report suspected criminal impersonation, identity theft, or fraudulent voting (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-562).
  • Practical Reality with Law Enforcement: Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-413(h), the chief poll manager is legally responsible for maintaining order inside the polling place. When local police or sheriff’s deputies arrive at a polling place, their role is to preserve the peace. They do not have access to the state’s voter registration database (PollPad / ElectioNet) and cannot overrule poll workers on whether you receive a standard ballot. They can, however, take an official incident or informational report detailing your claim that someone may have unlawfully used your name/identity to vote.

2. Immediate Procedural Steps: Don’t Walk Away Without Exercising Your Rights

Before leaving the polling place or focusing solely on law enforcement, you must trigger the statutory election procedures designed to protect your vote:

  1. Ask for the Chief Poll Manager Immediately:
    Clerical or check-in errors happen frequently (e.g., checking in “John Smith Jr.” instead of “John Smith Sr.,” or a clerk scanning the wrong line). Demand that the chief manager look into the system log, verify the exact check-in time, and confirm whether an absentee ballot was returned in your name.
  2. If They Claim an Absentee Ballot Was Returned:
    If records indicate you requested an absentee ballot, you have the right under Georgia law to surrender/cancel that absentee ballot or execute an affidavit stating you never received, completed, or authorized that absentee ballot.
  3. Demand a Provisional Ballot (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418):
    Under federal law (the Help America Vote Act – HAVA) and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418, if a voter maintains they are eligible and registered, poll officers cannot simply turn them away. You are entitled to execute a provisional ballot voting certificate swearing under oath that you are eligible and have not previously voted in this election.
  4. Demand Written Tracking Information:
    Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(f), the poll officer must give you written information explaining how to access the free tracking system (via website or toll-free number) to see whether your provisional ballot was verified and counted, and if not, the exact reason why.

3. How to Document a Contemporary Paper Trail

To build an airtight record for county registrars, the State Election Board (SEB), law enforcement, or future legal challenges, compile the following evidence:

  • Official Sworn Documents (Your Primary Legal Record):
    • The Provisional Ballot Certificate & Envelope: Complete this carefully. It requires you to swear or affirm under penalty of law that you did not vote previously.
    • Challenge / Incident Form: Ask the poll manager to complete a contemporary incident log or write a note on the precinct roster. Note the poll manager’s name and badge/ID.
  • Contemporaneous Written Notes (Pen & Paper):
    Write down immediately (while memories are fresh):
    • Date, exact time of entry and check-in attempt.
    • Precinct name, county, and PollPad/station number where the clerk checked you in.
    • Name or description of the clerk and manager you spoke with.
    • Exactly what was said (e.g., “The clerk stated an in-person ballot was cast at 9:14 AM today,” or “They stated an absentee ballot was accepted on Oct 24th”).
  • Official Police Incident Report:
    If you call local police or the sheriff outside the polling place, request that the responding officer write an incident report documenting that you appeared in person with valid photo ID alleging someone fraudulently used your identity to vote. Obtain the officer’s name, badge number, and report/CAD incident number.
  • Immediate Escalation and Notice:
    • County Board of Registrars: Go or call directly to the main county elections office immediately. By law, county registrars have up to three days after the election to research and adjudicate provisional ballots.
    • Georgia State Election Board: File a formal complaint online or call the State Election Board’s Anonymous Complaint line 678-340-5261. The State Election Board maintains an investigations division specifically tasked with probing illegal voting and double-voting allegations.
    • Nonpartisan Election Protection Hotlines: Call 866-OUR-VOTE (866-687-8683) to have nonpartisan legal observers log the issue into their centralized tracking database.